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SHAPING TODAY'S BATTLEFIELD:
PUBLIC AFFAIRS AS AN OPERATIONAL FUNCTION

by

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A paper submitted to the Faculty of the Naval War College in partial satisfaction of the requirements of the Department of Joint Maritime Operations.

The contents of this paper reflect my own personal views and are not necessarily endorsed by the Naval War College or the Department of the Navy.

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Abstract of

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Public affairs (PA) is more relevant to operational success than ever before and should be considered an operational function. Three developments support this contention. First, the mass media's ability to impact operations is getting stronger. Secondly, the often-ambiguous aims sought in most operations today require greater communication of military goals and objectives, as well as public support. Third, there has been an increasing reliance on PA support by personnel working in information operations (IO). Effecting this change will require at least the following: a major cultural shift in how PA is regarded; stronger reliance on PA within command structures; new measures of PA effectiveness; network centric thinking in PA execution; and more emphasis on PA's operational implications in joint doctrine.

“An Army compelled to fight and win in the information age has no option but to leverage public affairs and derive its maximum contribution to combat power.”¹
- U.S. Army Field Manual 46-1

Thesis and Introduction

It is time to think about public affairs (PA) in a new way. The speed at which the world communicates, the ever-present threat of asymmetric warfare and the increasingly important role of domestic and international support for military operations make PA a real force multiplier. It simply cannot be ignored. “PAO factors have to be considered into the ‘battle rhythm’ of the war fighting commanders,” noted a senior officer assigned to Joint Task Force Noble Anvil in Kosovo. “We need to adjust to ensure we are doing what our PAO experts tell us is needed to help develop and maintain popular support.” And, he added, “we need to have PAO warfighters, folks and a plan that are as nasty as the enemy.”² Though it will always retain its traditional supporting roles - such as media escorting and internal information - PA today boasts new operational relevance as its impact on the conduct of military operations intensifies.

It is the thesis of this paper that, in view of the increasing importance of PA to the operational commander, it should be considered an operational function. In his book on operational art, Milan Vego defines an operational function as that which is relevant theater-wide and allows the commander to “plan, prepare, conduct, and sustain military actions across the full range of military operations.”³ In a sense, PA already meets these criteria. Like *intelligence* or *logistics*, it must be established early in theater and well synchronized, for the media are often there before the troops. Like *command and control*, it must be maintained throughout the operation and aids greatly in the communication process. And like

operational fires, it helps shape the battlefield by managing those efforts that influence the decisions of political leaders and bolster the morale of one's own troops.

For the skeptic, however, there are three other and more compelling reasons why PA ought to be considered an operational function. First, the mass media as a whole is going through profound changes. The move towards globalization, an increasing reliance on technology and the infusion of fewer journalists with military experience have drastically altered the landscape of military/media relations. Taken together, these developments make the media more powerful, accelerate battle rhythm and further blur the levels of war. As the military managers of this relationship PAOs must keep abreast of these changes, for in an era where news reporting is often just as significant as military action to determining success, PA quite literally becomes an operational tool.

Secondly, the varied and often-ambiguous aims sought in most operations today require effective communication of military goals and objectives. Public support for military operations other than war (MOOTW) is neither inconsequential nor a given. Public affairs represents one of the most potent measures for establishing and maintaining this support. Moreover, PA operates across the broad spectrum of conflict. It is just as critical in the pre-hostilities phase as it is during actual conflict and post-hostilities.

Third, there has been an increasing reliance on PA support by personnel working in information operations (IO), especially with regard to psychological operations (PSYOPS). PA has become an added capability to IO efforts, aiding in the coordination of themes and messages and, through media analysis, offering an alternative method of battle damage assessment (BDA). Though controversial, this integration will continue, making PA more than just a bit player in information management campaigns.

The *Daily Times*, they are a'changing

Throughout our nation's history, the media have consistently been a presence on the battlefield. Commodore Dewey carried them aboard his flagship into Manila Bay; the legendary Ernie Pyle and Walter Cronkite brought World War II to America's doorstep and, of course, CNN gave us Desert Storm "live and in color". But today the media are even more potent, their impact on operations greater than ever. They not only report the news, they shape and define the attitudes and actions of political and military leaders. Troops simply cannot be deployed anymore without some consideration given to the effect the press will have on the outcome. "Military operations can no longer be defined only in terms of fire and maneuver," observed General Anthony Zinni after serving as Commander, Combined Task Force United Shield in Somalia. "The U.S. commander must understand how to deal with the media and the important implications of media coverage."⁴

Three major changes occurring in the media today make Zinni's observation all the more accurate. First and perhaps most significantly, is the media's trend towards globalization. In just the past 10 years TV viewership worldwide has tripled to 1.2 billion people. More than 120 communications satellites now beam programming to every inhabited continent.⁵ CNN alone uses more than 700 broadcast affiliates worldwide; the Associated Press services 240 bureaus, and Reuters boasts just under 2,000 journalists in 157 countries.⁶ As one commentator dryly noted, "In bars, airports, aircraft, hotel lobbies, corner shops and anywhere else where people might pause and watch, the news pours out in a steady, heady stream."⁷

Extending this global reach is the conglomeration of several large media companies. In September 1999, CBS merged with Viacom, and more recently America Online struck a deal with Time Warner to create the largest media company in the history of the world. The trend is also occurring in Europe, where media giant TCI/Bertelsmann seeks to expand its market share as well. Mergers such as these point to a growing and more diversified media capable of reaching the public in myriad ways. The America Online/Time Warner deal, for instance, will permit that company to deliver news and information through four national magazines, three cable channels (including CNN) and, of course, the Internet.⁸ "The net effect of all this media structuring," asserts retired Rear Admiral Brent Baker, a former Navy Chief of Information, "is that the global public will have more media options during war and peace – and more and more, they will get their information in nontraditional ways."⁹ More options will lead to greater choice on the part of consumers, and that, of course, will fuel keener competition between these conglomerates. The military commander will thus be faced with more sophisticated media organizations all vying for more consumers, more access, and more of his attention.

A second major development is the media's increasing reliance on modern technology. The Internet, satellite communications and digital photography have all allowed for real-time reporting of events, giving consumers instantaneous access to unfolding operations. The news cycle today is 24 hours long - deadlines now are hourly or very often whenever the story can be filed. As a result, the lines dividing the levels of war are quickly diminishing. A minor skirmish reported live in some distant hinterland could now have (and has had) strategic implications. Moreover, technology has made it harder for the military to control news content. Reporters simply don't need military communications assets to get

their stories out. "Words and film can be transmitted by satellite, and the equipment needed to perform this technological wizardry is getting smaller and cheaper. No longer will reporters spend more time finding a way to file than reporting the news."¹⁰

Finally, a third trend shaping the military/media relationship is the changing demographics of the mass media itself. In the years since the Vietnam War, fewer and fewer reporters have had military experience. Even those who have are often managed by editors and producers who themselves are militarily ignorant. "With the end of the draft in 1972 and the influx of women into journalism," notes media expert Peter Braestrup, "...you have a bias not so much against the military as such, but a bias against 'institutional' or 'operations' stories in favor of 'social issues' and 'people' stories."¹¹ Exacerbating this problem is the sheer number of people capable of reporting news. Technology has also made it possible for anyone with a handheld camcorder or laptop computer to be a reporter.

The risks posed by these changes are real. Competition among the media moguls and high technology are driving reporters to deliver stories faster and with less detail than ever before. Inaccuracy in preliminary reports is too often commonplace. To their credit, though, most professional journalists will always seek accuracy over timeliness.* But the same cannot be said for the novice reporter or the ordinary citizen with a digital camera. Thus, a commander's objectives may get distorted over the airwaves; policy goals and public opinion may shift underneath him as the result of a single report, and an enemy's behavior may take a turn for the worse. Though daunting, these challenges are manageable. PA activities applied

*This is an assessment based on the author's 10 years of experience as a PAO and interviews conducted with three national reporters for this paper. Interestingly, Dale Eisman of the *Virginian Pilot* had an entirely different concern regarding media competition. "I don't know that accuracy will be sacrificed to speed," he says, "but there is a real danger that in the push to supply information quickly we will be unable to supply meaning."

early and with enough emphasis can greatly minimize the negative effects of the media's growing power and, in fact, capitalize on it to bolster military efforts. "To exclude the PAO from operational planning because the commander doesn't like the media," says General Walter Boomer, "is like excluding the medical officer because [the commander] doesn't like to deal with casualties."¹² Aggressive and experienced PAOs are still a commander's best tool for leveraging the power of technology and educating an ill-informed or novice reporter.

The Impact of Public Affairs on Modern Operations

Another reason PA ought to be considered an operational function is the very character of military operations today. The risk of total war has greatly diminished since the fall of the Soviet Union, but threats to both national and global security still abound. As a result, the United States remains actively engaged across a broad range of operations, involving both limited war and military operations other than war (MOOTW). By their very nature, these diverse operations require a far greater reliance on PA than conventional warfare.

First, limited wars and MOOTW are heavily driven by political considerations. Though war in general is an extension of politics, "MOOTW are more sensitive to such considerations due to the overriding goal to prevent, preempt or limit potential hostilities."¹³ The objectives may be varied and often difficult to articulate. And they may change midstream, as we saw in Somalia. Moreover, because the threat often posed by these operations may not be so obvious, we can expect the public and the media to be increasingly skeptical about the use of military force. For all these reasons, political and military leaders must learn to "communicate the goals of policies and the objectives of military operations

clearly and simply enough so that the widest of audiences can envision the ways and means being used to reach those goals.”¹⁴ Public support for such missions is crucial. And there is no better way to garner this support than through a robust and comprehensive PA plan.

Secondly, MOOTW are increasingly information-dependent. Success or failure is very often determined by the degree to which one side can affect the other’s behavior without firing a shot. Secretary of the Navy Richard Danzig refers to this as the “Battle of Wills” and predicts that it will become the preferred method of conducting operations in the future.

“Many of the things that are happening that might have been in another age thought of as battles for military advantage...are in fact efforts to achieve victories in sapping the will of one or another side. In the end, our ability to persevere...is a consequence of our ability...to convey the right messages on the larger stage. Someone has to become adept at those kinds of things.”¹⁵ That someone is going to be a PAO. Indeed, Danzig has called for a complete re-evaluation of the PA community for just this reason. In his estimation, PA should be considered a warfighting specialty. “[PAOs] are absolutely essential to information warfare of this kind... We need to turn to a world in which there are expectations that our most talented warriors will acquire some public affairs kinds of skills.”¹⁶

Third, operations today and in the future are not only going to be joint, they are going to be combined. And they are going to require substantial interagency coordination. This multinational and organizational aspect requires unique sensitivity on the part of joint force commanders, especially with regard to media relations. For political reasons, coalition partners may differ widely on what PA themes and messages are stressed. Many nations simply do not encourage the same open and cooperative relationship with reporters that Americans do. Others take openness a step too far, advocating the manipulation of the press

for what amounts to propaganda purposes. The same can be said for non-governmental or private volunteer organizations, each of which it seems has a separate and sometimes conflicting agenda driving its interaction with the media. The resulting tension can actually threaten coalition solidarity. General Zinni ran up against this problem during Operation United Shield with the Italians. Having deployed their troops en masse for the first time since World War II, they were eager for media coverage and desired a much more active PA approach than the U.S. espoused.¹⁷ Zinni had to balance his directives from Washington against the interests of our allies, ensuring the basic desires of all were in some measure satisfied. As the U.S. expands its influence and participation in combined efforts, these disparate approaches could become preeminent issues. Extensive coordination and synchronization of PA activities will greatly diminish the negative impact they may have on operations.

Lastly, and unlike some other operational functions, PA is relevant across the broad spectrum of conflict. It can be employed aggressively during peacetime to deter hostilities and utilized during actual conflict to help leaders communicate intent and foster domestic support. During the post-hostilities phase of an operation, PA also demonstrates U.S. and allied commitments to peace and stability and aids in the restoration of law and order. In fact, Admiral Leighton Smith, Jr., commander of IFOR forces in Bosnia, described public information as one of his four main elements of power, right alongside economic, diplomatic and military power. He advocated a strategic and integrated approach to PA that capitalized on its value as a flexible deterrent option. "Throughout the operation [in Bosnia]," notes independent researcher Pascalle Combelles Siegel, "commanders made extensive use of public information and PSYOP to help achieve operational goals...It was one of the

commander's major tools to communicate intentions, might and resolve to the local populations and the [former warring factions]."¹⁸

If recent history is any indication, military participation in MOOTW will only continue. If so, PA will become even more critical. The need to adequately communicate goals, achieve unity of effort and influence the behavior and attitudes of a truly international audience are all measures of success in these types of operations, and all of them rely heavily on effective PA. As Siegel puts it, "...many officers are convinced that victory is no longer determined on the ground, but in media reporting. This is even more true in peace support operations where the goal is not to conquer territory or defeat an enemy but to persuade parties in conflict (as well as the local populations) into a favored course of action."¹⁹ No stronger case could be made for reevaluating PA's place in the operational hierarchy.

A Dynamic Duo: Information Operations and Public Affairs

A final reason that PA should be considered an operational function is its increasing significance to the conduct of Information Operations (IO). PAOs now routinely sit in as active members of joint information planning cells, lending support to IO in any number of ways. They help draft and disseminate a commander's themes and messages, provide local and international media feedback analysis and aid in countering propaganda. "Closely coordinated and synchronized PA activities have become vital," argue Major General David Grange and Colonel James Kelley. "Accurate and timely PA - where commanders are viewed as doing everything in their power to present the truth - are critical to IO's conduct..."²⁰

The most important thing PA brings to the operational table is credibility. And that is a quality much in demand by IO. In fact, it is essential. By law and certainly by doctrine,

PAOs are prohibited from intentionally deceiving the public. This means that messages delivered through PA channels and media reports are more likely to be believed by one's adversary or his populace than what is transmitted solely through IO or PSYOPS. By helping to draft and implement a CINC's themes and messages, PAOs thus give them added weight. It was no surprise to anyone, for example, that Saddam Hussein and Mohammed Aidid regularly watched CNN to discern allied and American intent as weighed against the IO efforts of joint forces in country.

Public affairs also provides a forum through which a commander's themes and messages can be regularly updated and quickly disseminated to one's own forces. During Operation Joint Forge, NATO's peacekeeping mission in Bosnia, the JTF PAO published a weekly report of themes and messages for distribution to all base camps. It served as a virtual playbook for supporting media relations and command and control and ensured that "all spoke with one voice in accordance with the commander's intent for IO."²¹ When closely coordinated like this, PA has proven to be a key factor in ensuring that resolve and intent is "clearly communicated and correctly interpreted by the adversary," for his confusion can only hamper or prolong an operation.²²

Credibility also makes PA an effective tool to counter enemy propaganda. "A good public affairs program can deter propaganda, and when propaganda is disseminated, PA is usually the first to respond and counter the disinformation," says Captain Mark Van Dyke, who served as the chief of public information for IFOR during Operation Joint Endeavour in Bosnia-Herzegovina. Public affairs can protect against the effects of adversarial propaganda by providing a regular flow of credible information, and it can counter propaganda attempts by immediately providing factual information through personal interviews, press briefings,

photo opportunities, media visits to the scene of an incident, or the release of digital images.

"Public affairs can dull the effects of propaganda by providing people with truthful information to choose from," adds Van Dyke. "In a well-informed society, people will generally be able to tell the difference between fact and fiction. In less informed societies, with state-controlled media, it becomes even more important to use our own public affairs channels to get the word out."²³ With the media's global reach and near instantaneous reporting capability, a credible and aggressive PA program can thus make all the difference to IO's counter-propaganda efforts.

The integration of PA and IO is risky, however. If allowed to proceed unchecked, it could lead to the loss of the very credibility PA enjoys and IO needs. Given the tremendous influence of the media on public opinion, such an occurrence would be disastrous. Veteran NBC military correspondent Jim Miklaszewski put it this way: "Public information officers should be familiar with and knowledgeable about all aspects of U.S. military operations, including PSYOP. If, however, the PAOs are used to conduct actual psychological operations, their credibility, and the credibility of the entire U.S. military would be seriously damaged."²⁴

Clearly, PA support to IO and PSYOP must be carefully monitored. Joint doctrine notes that while "they reinforce each other and involve close cooperation and coordination, by law PA and PSYOP must be separate and distinct."²⁵ Commanders must seek a balance between them that enhances operational effectiveness without risking credibility. But the mere fact that IO personnel now appreciate PA's importance speaks volumes about its operational relevance. Making it an operational function will both validate this sentiment and go a long way to preserving it as "separate and distinct."

Counter Arguments

There are some potential problems with these arguments. One might contend, for example, that recent advances in communications technology are actually making PA *less* important. After all, reporters can now file stories independently of security review; they can write, edit and deliver the news right from a laptop or from their offices in the Pentagon. And on the flip side, military commanders can now use that same technology to communicate directly with the public, bypassing the media altogether. The Internet is a great example. During Operation Allied Force a joint Web site established by the U.K. recorded over seven and a half million hits in just two months. Three million of them were from the U.S. and fifty thousand were from the former Yugoslavia.²⁷ Again, this is a valid point. But while technology has eased military/media interaction, it has not nullified it. Both sides still need each other. "No matter what the advances in technology, the media must still rely on the military for information concerning its activities and operations," says Jim Miklaszewski. And despite the military's ability to communicate through the Internet, he believes "the American people are averse to taking their news directly from a government source, military or civilian."²⁸ Dale Eisman, military reporter for the *Virginian Pilot* agrees. "PAOs and the press still need each other," he says. "Your side provides us with access to the battlefield and the warriors. We provide a measure of credibility that government agencies - most of them anyway - are unlikely to ever enjoy."²⁹ It is, then, a mutually supporting relationship. The PAO's responsibility to manage this relationship will not diminish because of technology. If anything, it will only expand.

One could also argue in counterpoint that recent success in PA/IO integration only proves that PA is properly a support element and should remain so. Indeed, broadening the

role of PA by making it an operational function might threaten its much-needed credibility with the media. This is a tempting assertion, but it ignores the fact that, unlike IO or PSYOPS, PA operates in the global information environment. It is not targeted specifically at one or another audience but seeks rather to inform and educate an international public. Information operations, on the other hand, are prevented by legislation from targeting domestic audiences, and foreign policy often limits some of what they can do internationally.²⁶ This leaves PA as the principal tool for promoting domestic policy at home and public diplomacy abroad. And, as previously noted, PA operates across the spectrum of conflict. Making it an operational function will recognize the larger role it plays in military operations and prevent it from being regarded by the media or the public as a subset or co-opted element to IO.

The Road Ahead: Conclusions and Recommendations

Making the argument that PA should be an operational function is relatively easy, but effecting a real sea change among military commanders about how PA is perceived and conducted is truly another matter. As they say, talk is cheap. So, here are few suggestions for how to bring it about:

1) Change the cultural perception of PA. Sadly, though attitudes have improved, many operational commanders still seem to regard PA as an administrative task, peripheral to the conduct of operations. As one network television producer put it, many PAOs are simply "shut out by their own CINCs, [and] sometimes their CINCs do not tell them the truth."³⁰ This attitude must change. And change can best be accomplished by an increased emphasis

on PA education and training.* Of the three service academies only West Point currently offers a course in media studies, and that is only an elective. And at the service college level, only the Air Force devotes any significant time in the core curriculum to public affairs. The Army's Command and General Staff College offers two electives on the subject, and, although it devotes some time in Block IV of the Joint Military Operations curriculum to media training, the Naval War College just recently cancelled one of its two media studies electives. This scant academic attention is unfortunate. Future commanders will be planning and conducting operations that rely on PA more and more, and yet little emphasis is being placed on it in their formative training.

In addition to formal classes, another way to educate officers might be a series of exchange programs, wherein operators are encouraged to serve tours in PA. Secretary Danzig has proposed one such program for the Navy and Marine Corps, believing that operational officers who have worked in the PA arena will tend to think early and often about it in planning future operations.³¹ The assumption is probably correct, but it should also be applied in the reverse. In services like the Navy and Air Force, where PAOs are single-tracked specialists, some brief exposure to purely operational disciplines would help them appreciate the operator's perspective and open dialogue. Such programs will only work, however, if they gain a high enough priority. Officers who participate should be the very top performers in their fields and should be duly recognized by promotion boards.

*This is not a new idea. Many people in the military and the media have suggested that greater attention must be paid to PA education and training. For an excellent discussion on the matter see Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple, A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military* (Nashville, TN: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), Chapter 12.

2) Strengthen PA within the command organization. The command structure in joint task forces must also reflect a larger role for PAOs. They should be given direct and unimpeded access to the commander and must be permitted to express their views as the subject matter expert unfiltered by other, more senior, officers on the staff. Instead of serving solely on the personal staff of the commander, perhaps PA personnel should constitute their own "J" code, making PA co-equal with the other operational functions. Joint doctrine for foreign internal defense (FID) already supports this notion to some degree. It stipulates the PAO's presence on the CINC's FID Advisory Committee, where he or she sits as a full voting member with the other codes and interagency representatives.³² Extending this idea further to the JTF level may seem a bit radical, but it is a step in the right direction.

3) Develop new PA measures of effectiveness (MOE). The old ways of measuring PA success are no longer valid. It is simply not enough to know how many hometown press releases were sent or how many minutes of airtime a given service obtains on a major network back home. Telling the story of our soldiers and sailors is still important; but, if it is to be an operational function, PA must embrace other MOEs. In Kosovo, for example, the IO cell paid close attention to the PAO's weekly media analysis report, gleaning from it valuable information about what stories were being reported in the local press and which ones reflected the commander's themes and messages. It showed great promise as an MOE for IO and PA alike.*

* The Executive Summary to Jurkowsky and Van Dyke's draft, "Military Public Affairs Lessons Learned: From Desert Storm to Allied Force," also mentions the need for new "metrics" to assess coalition PA effectiveness, underscoring the need for changes in service culture.

Perhaps a PAO could be assigned to a civil affairs (CA) unit as well. Working in country with CA personnel, an experienced PAO could provide firsthand feedback as to the efficacy of themes and messages and even help facilitate media coverage of CA efforts.

Increased use of the Internet is also recommended. Not only is the Internet an effective way to communicate directly with domestic and international audiences, it offers a method to counter propaganda, influence enemy opinions and obtain intelligence. Journalists use the Internet every day to monitor the competition. So should we.

4) Incorporate Network Centric thinking into PA. Some of the tenets of network centric warfare – shared awareness, technology integration and self-synchronization – are also applicable to PA in the Information Age. PAOs must seek ways to adapt them as appropriate in the planning and execution process. Doing so would keep PAOs abreast of developing doctrine, enhance their standing with operators and offer real opportunities to counter the media's growing reliance on technology. During Operation Allied Force, for example, PAOs aggressively employed the SIPRNET to coordinate and conduct media transport and interviews. The speed at which they were able to communicate and the shared awareness that SIPRNET use engendered boosted operational confidence in the PA effort and significantly improved operational effectiveness. Such endeavors warrant further study. No operational function can ignore the implications of network centric warfare; public affairs is certainly no exception.

5) Update joint doctrine to reflect PA's operational impact. Most joint publications dealing with the conduct of military operations refer to PA only briefly. It is often described as an important element, and commanders are urged to include PA in their planning. But there is scant discussion of the operational contributions of a robust PA effort. To be sure,

some of these contributions are only now being realized, and it may take some time before they can be fully appreciated or even understood. Nonetheless, a more specific description of what PA offers the commander is needed in our doctrine. The doctrine for joint operations today should devote as much attention to PA as it does to other operational functions, for it has become just as vital. Updating doctrine to reflect this reality will cement PA's place as an operational function and help facilitate the four suggestions above.

Clearly, PA has passed the test for becoming an operational function. Going back to Professor Vego's definition, we see that not only is it a theater-wide concern for the commander, but given the power of the media and technology today, it has global repercussions. It certainly enhances a commander's ability to "plan, prepare, conduct, and sustain military actions", because those very actions today call for greater articulation, public support and coalition sensitivity. Indeed, in many cases success or failure is determined more by media reporting and PA than it is by military prowess. And lastly, as we have seen, PA weighs in "across the full range of military operations" - from low intensity conflict to total war, from before the first troops land until well after the last ones leave. It is, in the words of one Army general, "a part of going to war, just like logistics. You've got to have bullets and you've got to have a logistics system. You've got to have a public affairs system and you've got to have assets."³³ It is time, indeed, to think of public affairs in a new way.

NOTES

¹Department of the Army, Field Manual 46-1, *Public Affairs Operations* (Washington, D.C.: 1997), 32.

²Thomas J. Jurkowsky and Mark A. Van Dyke, Navy Office of Information White Paper, "Military Public Affairs Lessons Learned: From Desert Storm to Allied Force [draft]" (Washington, D.C.: Navy Office of Information, 1999, photocopied), 7-9.

³Milan Vego, *On Operational Art* (Newport, RI: Naval War College, 1999), 267.

⁴Anthony Zinni and Frederick M. Lorenz, "Media Relations: A Commander's Perspective," *Marine Corps Gazette* (December 1995): 67.

⁵Randall G. Bowdish, "Information-Age Psychological Operations," *Military Review* (December/February 1999) [journal online]; available from <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/English/DecFeb99/bowdish.htm>.

⁶"AP Today: Facts and Figures," *Associated Press Web site*, available from http://www.ap.org/pages/aptoday/aptoday_fact_fig.html; "CNN Web sites in the News," *Cable News Network (CNN) Web site*, available from <http://cnn.com/ads/e.market/home.html>; "Investors: Introduction," *Reuters Web site*, available from <http://www.reuters.com/investors/>.

⁷P.W.D. Edwards, "The Military-Media Relationship: A Time to Redress the Balance?" *RUSI Journal* (October 1998): 43.

⁸Adam Bryant, "Something Old, Something New," *Newsweek*, 24 January 2000, 26-27.

⁹Brent Baker, "War and Peace in a Virtual World," *Proceedings* (April 1997): 38.

¹⁰H.D.S Greenway, "This Warring Century," *Columbia Journalism Review* (September/October 1999) [journal online]; available from <http://www.cjr.org/year/99/5/war.asp>.

¹¹Frank Aukofer and William P. Lawrence, *America's Team: The Odd Couple, A Report on the Relationship Between the Media and the Military* (Nashville, TN: The Freedom Forum First Amendment Center, 1995), 74.

¹²Ibid., 80.

¹³Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Doctrine for Military Operations Other Than War* (Joint Pub 3-07) (Washington, D.C.: 1995), I-1.

¹⁴Frank J. Stech, "Winning CNN Wars," *Parameters* (Autumn 1994): 51.

¹⁵Richard Danzig, remarks delivered for General Graves B. Erskine Lecture Series (Quantico, VA, 28 April 1999) [speech online]: available from http://www.chinfo.navy.mil/navpalib/people/secnav/speeches/sn_ersk.txt.

¹⁶Ibid.

¹⁷Zinni, 71

¹⁸Jurkowsky and Van Dyke, "From Desert Storm to Allied Force," quoted in Pascale Combelles Siegel, *Target Bosnia: Integrating Information Activities in Peace Operations* (Washington DC: DOD Command and Control Research Program [CCRP], Institute for National Strategic Studies, National Defense University, January 1998), 146-147.

¹⁹Ibid., quoted in *Target Bosnia*, 1.

²⁰David L. Grange and James A. Kelley, "Information Operations for the Ground Commander," *Military Review* (March/April 1997) [journal online]; available from <http://www.cgsc.army.mil/milrev/english/marapr97/grange.htm>.

²¹Center for Army Lessons Learned, "Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Information Operations (IO)," *Newsletter 99-15* [journal online]; available from <http://call.army.mil/call/newsltrs/99-15/99-15toc.htm>.

²²Ibid, quoted in Air Command and Staff College Research Project 95-053, "Planning and Executing of Conflict Termination," Chapter 3, Case Study Analysis (Maxwell Air Force Base, AL: ACSC, 1995), p. 9.

²³Mark Van Dyke, CAPT, USN, interview by author, 1 February 2000, Newport, RI., electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

²⁴NBC military correspondent James Miklaszewski, interview by author, 11 January 2000, Newport, RI., electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

²⁵Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Public Affairs in Joint Operations* (Joint Pub 3-61) (Washington, D.C.: 1997), III-18.

²⁶Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for Information Operations* (Joint Pub 3-13) (Washington, D.C.: 1998), I-13, I-17.

²⁷Jurkowsky and Van Dyke, "From Desert Storm to Allied Force," 10.

²⁸Miklaszewski, interview by author.

²⁹ *Virginian Pilot* military correspondent Dale Eisman, interview by author, 12 January 2000, Newport, RI., electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

³⁰ Network television producer (name withheld on request), interview by author, 11 January 2000, Newport, RI., electronic mail, Naval War College, Newport, RI.

³¹ Danzig, remarks delivered for General Graves B. Erskine Lecture Series (Quantico, VA, 28 April 1999).

³² Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Joint Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)* (Joint Pub 3-07.1) (Washington, D.C.: 1996), II-9.

³³ Aukofer and Lawrence, *America's Team*, 135.

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